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Abstract
We study a simple exchange model in which price is fixed and the amount
of a good transferred between actors depends only on the actors’ respective
budgets and the existence of a link between transacting actors. The model
induces a simply-connected but possibly multi-component bipartite graph.
A trading session on a fixed graph consists of a sequence of exchanges be-
tween connected buyers and sellers until no more exchanges are possible. We
deem a trading session “feasible” if all of the buyers satisfy their respective
demands. If all trading sessions are feasible the graph is deemed “success-
ful”, otherwise the feasibility of a trading session depends on the order of
the sequence of exchanges. We demonstrate that topology is important for
the success of trading sessions on graphs. In particular, for the case that
supply equals demand for each component of the graph, we prove that the
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graph is successful if and only if the graph consists of components each of
which are complete bipartite. For the case that supply exceeds demand, we
prove that the other topologies also can be made successful but with finite
reserve (i.e., excess supply) requirements that may grow proportional to the
number of buyers. Finally, with computations for a small instance of the
model, we provide an example of the wide range of performance in which
only the connectivity varies. These results taken together place limits on
the improvements in performance that can be expected from proposals to
increase the connectivity of sparse exchange networks.
1. Introduction
Networked infrastructures are designed to efficiently deliver goods be-
tween actors; furthermore, they are designed to continue functioning even if
some components of the network fail. In most such infrastructures, suppliers
maintain a reserve against a range of likely demand scenarios. One class of
strategies to reduce such reserve requirements, and central to Smart Grid[1, 2]
proposals, for example, employ a dramatic increase in the connectivity of the
network and the exchanges that take place on them[3]. On the other hand,
an increase in network connectivity may under some circumstances degrade
rather than improve network performance, as illustrated by, e.g., the venera-
ble Braess paradox and its variations[4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10]. Therefore we want
to assess the impact of those proposed upgrades to networked infrastructures
that increase its connectivity between actors. As a first step we study a
simple model of exchanges between non-cooperative actors. In particular,
we will show that it is easy to generate Braess-like paradoxes wherein the
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ability to meet all demands is degraded by nothing more than increasing the
number of links.
2. Description of the Exchange Model
2.1. Trading between a buyer and a seller
First we consider an unsupervised bilateral trade between a buyer b with
demand Db and a seller s with supply Ss; alternatively we may consider
the exchange of two goods with “supply” as one good and “demand” as the
other good. We assume that the trade exchanges supply for demand at a
fixed unit exchange rate (price). The roles of seller and buyer are fixed, e.g.,
buyers do not become sellers. We signify the access of buyers to sellers with
a link between the two actors. Trading is not optional; a trade between a
buyer and seller must occur when (a) there exists a link between the buyer
and the seller (b) the buyer has positive demand (c) the seller has positive
supply. The amount traded is the maximum that can be traded given the
available supply and demand (but see the end of 3.1 where we relax this
requirement). Therefore at least one actor’s supply or demand is always
reduced to zero, i.e., if the buyer with demand Db = δ trades with seller
with supply Ss = σ, the result of the trade will be that the buyer is left with
max(0, δ − σ) and the seller is left with max(0, σ − δ) (e.g., see Figure 1).
This simple budget-constrained exchange model[11, 12] deviates from both
other exchange models[13, 14] and standard assumptions of economics[15]
because we abandoned the classical concept of bi-modal traders by instead
fixing an agent as either a buyer or a seller and we imposed a more restrictive
specification of trading preferences; see [12] for a full discussion).
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2.2. Trading between many buyers and sellers
The exchange model[11] employed here then consists of a fixed set of Nb
buyers (with total demand D) and Ns sellers (with total supply S). Through-
out we will assume S = D. The L links between buyers and sellers induce a
bipartite graph (see Figure 2); e.g., the case in which all buyers are accessible
to all sellers is the complete bipartite graph KNb,Ns .
We define a trading session:
Definition 1. A trading session on the graph consists of one of the (up to
L!) possible sequences of all possible trades on the graph of L links.
Because each link trades at most once, it may happen that a trade never
occurs over a link because a buyer or seller has been depleted by trades on
other links. It may therefore happen that a demand remains unmet at the
end of the trading session. Therefore we define “feasible” and “successful”
as follows:
Definition 2. A trading session is feasible if it reduces all demands to zero,
otherwise it is infeasible.
Definition 3. A graph is successful if all possible trading sessions are feasi-
ble.
2.3. Statement of the problem
The complete bipartite graph KNb,Ns is apparently successful according
to Def. 3 if supply equals demand. On the other hand, inspection of Figure
2 shows that there is also a minimally connected multi-component bipartite
graph that is successful. We ask, given a set of initial demands and initial
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supplies, which graphs are successful? We suspect that for some graphs there
would be some orderings of the exchanges in which at least one demand would
not be met at the end of the session: indeed we show in the next section that
it is necessary and sufficient for each component (for which, within that
component, supply equals demand) to be complete bipartite in order to be
successful.
3. Results
3.1. Statement and Proof of the Theorem
Here we characterize the topology of successful (order-independent) graphs.
First we state and prove a useful lemma. Then we state and prove the main
theorem.
Lemma 1. If the removal of the endpoints of a link in a bipartite component
separates the component into multiple components that are complete bipartite,
there exists a link in the component with endpoints that do not separate the
component into multiple components.
Proof. Consider a link l in a bipartite component with endpoints whose re-
moval separates the component into multiple components that are complete
bipartite. If any of the resulting components are single links, any one of
them would be a link with endpoints that do not separate the component
into multiple components. If no components are single links, any link that
does not contain the only connections to l for its component would be a link
with endpoints that do not separate the component into multiple compo-
nents.
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Theorem 1. Given that supply equals demand, the demands are reduced to
zero at the end of every trading session iff each component (for which, within
that component, supply equals demand) is complete bipartite.
Sufficiency. Assume for contradiction that a demand may not be reduced
to zero at the end of a trading session when each component is complete
bipartite and supply equals demand within each component. We construct
an example of this. In our example, each component is complete bipartite,
supply equals demand within each component, and a demand Db in compo-
nent C is not met at the end of a session. However, this is impossible. If
some demand remains in C, some supply remains in C. Since C is complete
bipartite, there exists a link between the buyer b with unmet demand and
a seller with remaining supply. Therefore, a trade can occur. This contra-
dicts that the trading session has ended. Therefore, when each component
is complete bipartite and supply equals demand within each component, the
demands are reduced to zero at the end of every trading session.
Necessity. Without loss of generality, we prove necessity for a component C
by strong induction. Obviously, supply must equal demand within a com-
ponent. Let CNb,Ns be a bipartite component with Nb buyers and Ns sellers.
Let GNb,Ns be a bipartite graph with Nb buyers and Ns sellers.
Base case Consider a configuration with a single buyer b and a single seller
s connected by a link l and Ss equals Db. If we remove l, the resulting
configuration cannot be successful. Therefore, G1,1 must be K1,1 for
the demand of b to be reduced to zero at the end of the trading session.
Induction hypothesis Assume for all Nb < m and Ns ≤ n or Nb ≤ m and
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Ns < n, that CNb,Ns must be KNb,Ns and supply must equal demand
for CNb,Ns to be successful.
Inductive step Consider a component Cm,n with L links and at least one
link between some buyer b and some seller s such that the removal of
the actor or actors that can no longer participate after a first trade
between b and s does not result in multiple components. The existance
of such a link is guaranteed by Lemma 1 and the induction hypothesis
if Cm,n is successful. Consider a first trade between b and s. After this
first trade, either Db or Ss has been reduced to zero. In any case, we can
remove the actor or actors that can no longer participate. According to
the induction hypothesis, the remaining component must be complete
bipartite to be successful. Now restore the actor or actors and undo
the first trade. There are three cases.
1. Only Db was reduced to zero by the first trade. Consider b’s links
to sellers. If b does not have links to all sellers, sequencing trades
so that the sellers to which b is linked are reduced as much as
possible by buyers other than b would leave b’s demand unmet at
the end of the session. This is possible because the component
without b is complete bipartite, all supplies are greater than zero,
and supply equals demand. Therefore b must have links to all
sellers in order to have its demand reduced to zero at the end of
every trading session.
2. Only Ss was reduced to zero by the first trade. Consider s’s links
to buyers. If s does not have links to all buyers, sequencing trades
so that the buyers to which s is linked are reduced as much as
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possible by sellers other than s would leave at least some of s’s
supply isolated at the end of the session, and at least one buyer
does not have its demand reduced to zero. This is possible because
the component without s is complete bipartite, all demands are
greater than zero, and supply equals demand. Therefore s must
have links to all buyers in order to have all demand reduced to
zero at the end of every trading session.
3. Db = Ss. One of b or s must have degree at least two or they
would be a separate component. Consider the one with lower
degree. Pick randomly in case of a tie. There are two cases.
b is picked If b does not have links to all sellers, sequencing
trades so that the sellers to which b is linked are reduced
as much as possible by buyers other than b would leave b’s
demand unmet at the end of the session. This is possible
because Db = Ss, s has degree at least two, the component
without b and s is complete bipartite, all supplies are greater
than zero, and supply equals demand. Therefore b must have
links to all supplies in order to have its demand reduced to
zero at the end of every trading session. Now consider s’s
links to buyers as in Case 2 above.
s is picked If s does not have links to all buyers, sequencing
trades so that the buyers to which s is linked are reduced
as much as possible by sellers other than s would leave at
least some of s’s supply isolated at the end of the session,
and at least one buyer does not have its demand reduced to
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zero. This is possible because Db = Ss, b has degree at least
two, the component without b and s is complete bipartite, all
demands are greater than zero, and supply equals demand.
Therefore s must have links to all buyers in order to have all
demand reduced to zero at the end of every trading session.
Now consider b’s links to sellers as in Case 1 above.
Therefore, both b and s must have links to all sellers and buyers,
respectively, in order to have all demand reduced to zero at the
end of every trading session.
Therefore Gm,n must be Km,n in order to have all demand reduced to
zero at the end of every trading session.
If we relax the requirement that the amount traded is the maximum that
can be traded given the available supply and demand, the theorem would
still hold because a trading session could still use that maximum amount or
combine successive trades to give the same result.
3.2. Enumeration
Here we study a special case (see Figure 2) in order to directly enumerate
the outcome of trading sessions. The graph in Figure 2 satisfies the conditions
of Theorem 1. All subsequent graphs considered here have the backbone of
the original four links shown in Figure 2. We generate a new graph by adding
1 ≤ k ≤ 5 links in every possible way to the original graph. For each k there
are
(
8
k
)
graphs with L = k + 4 links, each with L! different trading sessions.
9
We calculate the results of each trading session for each graph in order to
calculate the fraction of infeasible trading sessions (Def. 2) and the maximum
demand left by infeasible sessions. The results are displayed in the top and
bottom panels, respectively, of Figure 3. Of course we ensured in advance for
this example that each component has total supply equal to total demand
so that no configurations were trivially infeasible. The addition of even one
link to the graph of Figure 2 is enough to generate a substantial number
of trading sessions that cannot reduce the demands to zero. Indeed none
of the eight graphs with one extra link is successful. One of the 28 graphs
with two links added (corresponding to K2,1 ∪ K2,2) is successful but the
median fraction of infeasible trading sessions on all 28 graphs is higher than
the case of one link. The least successful graphs are those with four extra
links. Subsequently, adding links improves the situation (L = 9); finally, the
case of L = 12 (corresponding to K4,3) is always successful.
The median maximum demand left over in unsuccessful graphs (with
S = D)in the numerical experiments is 25− 30% of the initial demand. The
maximum demand left over can actually be arbitrarily close to 100% of the
initial demand as demonstrated by the lower bound in Section 3.3. This
translates into large reserves that would be required by the sellers in order
to meet demands on such graphs.
3.3. Statement and Proof of a Reserve Lower Bound
Here we characterize the reserves that would be required by sellers in
order to meet demands on unsuccessful graphs in the worst case.
Theorem 2. The reserves that would be required by sellers in order to meet
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demands on unsuccessful graphs can be proportional to Nb, the number of
buyers.
Proof. Consider a successful graph consisting of Nb buyers and Ns = Nb
sellers. Each buyer has demand D and each supplier has supply S = D.
Each seller si is connected to a buyer bi. Now create an unsuccessful graph
by adding links between seller s1 and buyers b2, b3, b4, ..., bNb . The supply
for s1 would have to be increased to Nb · D in order for this graph to be
successful.
3.4. Computing the Maximum Reserve Requirement
Here we give a nonlinear program to calculate the maximum demand left
unmet in an unsuccessful graph. Let lij equal one if the link between bi and
sj exists and zero otherwise. Then let tij ≥ 0 be the amount transacted over
lij. If ui ≥ 0 is the unmet demand at bi, the maximum unmet demand can
be computed by the nonlinear program in Figure 4. Note that the addition
of reserves can result in the need for still more reserves as demonstrated in
the lower bound in Section 3.3.
By removing the objective and constraints that contain ui and changing
the inequality ∑
j
tij ≤ Di,∀i
to the equality ∑
j
tij = Di, ∀i,
the nonlinear program in Figure 4 becomes the linear program in Figure 5
which can be used to determine whether a graph is feasible.
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4. Conclusions
For this simple exchange model on a bipartite graph representing trans-
actions between Nb buyers and Ns sellers, we have shown that the sellers,
with supply equal to demand, can satisfy demand for any sequence of trans-
actions if and only if each component is complete bipartite. For a network of
many small components, this requirement is not especially demanding. On
the other hand, if the network is for some other reason required to consist of
only one component, then there would exist some sequence of transactions
for which sellers could not meet demand unless all Nb ·Ns links were created
or unless the initial supply had been supplemented by reserves.
We have a nonlinear program (Figure 4) to calculate the maximum de-
mand left over in an unsuccessful graph. Nevertheless, the addition of re-
serves can result in the need for still more reserves as demonstrated in the
lower bound in Section 3.3.
We have not been concerned here with the question of how links arise in
the first place, i.e., what drives more vs. less links besides the minimal re-
quirement to allow an exchange between a buyer and a seller. In the context
of markets, the formation of the links in the first place would seem to require
a model (e.g., [13]) in which prices are discovered, e.g., through auctions or
brokers, which (as discussed in more detail in [12]) are left out of this model.
In some contexts[16], increasing the number of links might lower the price
of exchanges for some actors, or, policies such as the SmartGrid[1], might
for other reasons require many links. If the only penalty for adding links
were the one-time cost of installing the links themselves, it would be unsur-
prising that the benefits of additional connectivity would, in time, outweigh
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its expense. Nevertheless our results provide another potential penalty for
additional links between buyers and sellers that should be included in the
cost-benefit calculation.
While we expect that most proposals to reduce reserve requirements
would plan more than merely increased network connectivity, we have focused
this study of the simple case in which only the connectivity has increased.
Therefore we don’t expect to apply these results directly to any particular
proposal but instead expect these results to be only a part of a systematic
evaluation of such proposals. Nevertheless, our results suggest that the mere
increase in connectivity of a sparse exchange network will be problematic
unless the details of the topology are considered explicitly. In particular, as
both theory and computations suggest, there is a range of connectivity in
these networks that impose reserve requirements that might cancel out the
advantages that more links would otherwise provide.
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Figure 1: An example of an exchange before (top) and after (bottom) the trade. Note
that no further exchange is allowed on this link.
Figure 2: An example of a exchange network at the beginning of a trading session. In this
example, the demand will be met regardless of the order in which exchanges (specified by
the links) occur.
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Figure 3: Boxplots for results of the numerical evaluation of the fraction of infeasible
orderings (top) and maximum unfilled demand (bottom) as a function of links, with initial
conditions and the first four links fixed as in Figure 2. The target is placed at the median,
the top and bottom of the boxes correspond to the 75th and 25th percentiles, respectively.
The crosses mark the outliers.
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max
∑
i
ui,
subject to:
tij ≤ Di · lij, ∀i, ∀j;
tij ≤ lij · Sj,∀i, ∀j;∑
j
tij ≤ Di,∀i;∑
i
tij ≤ Sj,∀j;
ui = Di −
∑
j
tij,∀i;{∑
j
[
lij ·
(
Sj −
∑
i
tij
)]}
· ui = 0,∀i.
Figure 4: Nonlinear program to compute the maximum unmet demand for an unsuccessful
graph.
tij ≤ Di · lij,∀i, ∀j;
tij ≤ lij · Sj,∀i,∀j;∑
j
tij = Di,∀i;∑
i
tij ≤ Sj,∀j;
Figure 5: Linear program (constraint system) to determine the feasibility of a graph.
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